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  Nowadays, electronic payment system is an essential part of modern business. 
Credit cards or debit cards have been widely used for on-site or remote transactions, 
greatly reducing the need for inconvenient cash transactions. However, there have been a 
huge number of incidents of credit card frauds over the Internet due to the security 
weakness of electronic payment system.   A number of solutions have been proposed in 
the past to prevent this problem, but most of them were inconvenient and did not satisfy 
the needs of cardholders and merchants at the same time. 
In this thesis, we present a new secure card payment system called NNCC (No 
Number Credit Card) that significantly reduces the possibility of credit card frauds. This 
scheme is primarily designed for on-line shopping. NNCC is based on the Kerberos 
cryptographic framework that has been proven to be secure after being used in real world 
for decades.  In this proposed system, instead of card numbers, only the payment tokens 
are exchanged between the buyers and merchants. The token is generated based on the 
payment amount, the client information, and merchant information. However it does not 
contain the credit card number, so the merchant cannot acquire and illegally use the credit 
card number. A token is cryptographically secure and valid only for the designated 
merchant, so it is robust against eavesdropping. 
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This thesis describes the underlying cryptographic schemes, the operating principles, 
and the system design.  It explains the concept of Kerberos and the background in 
Cryptography. Then it discusses the new proposed system and the associated payment 
processes. We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype comprised of ecommerce 
web sites, client modules, payment server, and database. We show the architecture and 
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Electronic payment system (EPS) is an essential part of modern business. Credit cards 
or debit cards have been widely used for on-site or remote transactions, greatly reducing 
the need for inconvenient cash transactions. Furthermore EPS has become a critical piece 
for the operation of e-commerce systems where cash transactions are impractical. 
However, the proliferation of EPS has brought forth an undesirable effect. The 
convenience of credit cards gives a purchasing power to whoever has the card number 
with some extra information associated with it. When a 3rd party person obtains the card 
number, he has the same purchasing power as the legitimate owner and can falsely use 
the card without the knowledge of the legitimate owner. This can happen either 
inadvertently or on purpose.  Merchant may store the credit card numbers insecurely and 
get them stolen. Or fake web sites can be set up to grab the credit card information from 
unsuspecting victims. Once the card number and the associated information are given to a 
merchant, the number cannot be withdrawn. The present EPS does not provide a 
mechanism to hide the credit card numbers during transactions. 
Not surprisingly, there have been numerous incidents of credit card frauds over the 
Internet due to the weakness of EPS. For example, on August 16, 2009, a computer 
criminal named Albert Gonzalez was accused of stealing 170 million credit and ATM 
card numbers  and reselling them [1]. According to the data reported by Chronology of 
Data Breaches, a credit card fraud incident database, on April 22, 2009, a former 
employee at New York state tax department was accused of gathering secret data 
including credit card numbers and using them illegally [2].  The loss from the credit card 
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fraud is also large and the number of the cases is increasing. According to FBI‟s Internet 
Crime Complaint Center‟s 2008 Annual Report [3], the total loss from online fraud 
amounted to 265 million dollars in 2008, a 33.1% increase compared with 2007.        
Obviously the situation gets worse as people shop more on-line. People give out the 
credit card numbers to more e-commerce sites, which means higher chances of their 
credit card number stolen. Protecting credit card numbers is thus very important to reduce 
the loss. To this end, a number of solutions or protocols such as SSL [4], SET [5], and 
PayPal [6] have been proposed. While some of the solutions are used currently, some 
others are considered impractical. One of the challenging issues in developing a scheme 
is to satisfy both groups of users, namely the cardholders and the merchants. Cardholders 
do not want to directly give their card numbers to the merchants, while merchants want to 
get the card number to charge the payment conveniently. 
In this thesis, we present a new secure payment system that does not reveal the credit 
card number to the merchant while minimizing the inconvenience.  This system is based 
on the Kerberos framework [26] and only tokens are exchanged between the buyers and 
merchants. The tokens are generated based on the payment amount, the client information 
and merchant information, but it does not contain the credit card number. So the 
merchant cannot acquire and illegally use the credit card number. A token itself is 
cryptographically secure and valid only for the designated merchant, so it is robust 
against eavesdropping. This scheme can be best used during on-line shopping. We 
describe the underlying cryptographic scheme and the system construction.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the current payment systems. 
We categorize them into three groups and discuss the pros and cons of each payment 
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system. Chapter 3 explains the concept of Kerberos and the background in Cryptography. 
Chapter 4 discusses our proposed system and the payment processes in our system. In 
chapter 5 we implement a prototype system and discuss its performance. In chapter 6, we 
























  Generally an EPS falls into one of two categories: token based systems (Electronic 
cash system, or electronic currency systems), and account-based systems (Credit-debit) 
[7][8][9]. However the credit card system can be considered a separate category in some 
cases. In this Thesis, we also divide the EPS into three categories because the credit card 
system is most popular among the payment system.  
2.1 Electronic Cash System  
In electronic cash systems, customers buy digital tokens and surrender them to the 
merchant when they buy an item [7].  Electronic cash systems are further divided into 
two systems: smart card-based systems which use smart cards to store E-Cash, and Web 
Cash where user‟s E-Cash is stored in users‟ online account. The smart card-based 
system is not suitable for Internet Payment System due to the need for a physical contact 
to make a payment. Web Cash systems do not suffer from this problem and there are 
several systems proposed, e.g., Millicent Protocol [10], PayWord [11] and MicroMint 
[11], NetCash [12], eCash (or DigiCash) invented by David Chaum [13], and so forth.   
  Millicent Protocol is designed to process the small amount of money which can be a 
fraction of cents for the inexpensive internet contents. The most important parts of 
Millicent Protocol are Broker and Scrip. Broker provides account management and 
billing, and Scrip is digital cash which is valid for the specific merchant [10].  
  PayWord is credit-based. Customers need digital certificate signed by a broker. 
Digital certificate consists of customer‟s name, Broker name, public key which is used 
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for signature verification and so forth. PayWord shows its strong efficiency in the 
multiple transactions to the same merchant [11]. 
In MicroMint system, a coin is essential factor. A Broker sells coins to user, and 
customers give coins to merchants as payment. Merchants return tokens to the broker to 
get money.  The validity of token is easily checked, but it is almost impossible to forge it 
[11].  
Net Cash provides anonymous transaction and real time payment processing under 
multiple server environments [12].  
DigiCash (or eCash) is based on the RSA blinding signature in which the content of 
payment token is unknown to its signer. It provides public verification to its participants. 
Usually, this scheme is used where the owner and signer of token or message are 
different [13]. 
The advantage of Token based systems is that anonymous transactions are possible in 
some systems. For example, in DigiCash , it is impossible to know  to whom a specific 
token  was issued because the content of token is blind before it is signed by bank [13].  
Also, transaction processing is efficient because the exchange of tokens is performed 
locally without connecting a remote transaction server [7].  However, ECS still needs to 
maintain a large database of past transactions to prevent double spending from a single 
token.  Furthermore, it is required for both customers and merchants to purchase and 
install hardware and software to deal with electronic tokens which is burden to them and 





2.2 Account Based Systems 
  In the account-based system, the exchange of money between users‟ accounts is 
performed by a payment service provider [7][8]. The examples of Account-Based 
systems include PayPal [6], Netbill [14], NetCheque [15], and so forth 
PayPal is a very popular service for web-based transactions.  PayPal users can send or 
receive money by using their email address. It is widely used in C2C (Customer-to-
customer) transactions but can be also used in B2C (Business-to-customer) transactions 
[6] [16].   PayPal does not reveal the detailed account information of the transaction 
partner to the other users; its transactions assure some privacy. However, its 
authentication scheme is primitive and several ways are known to hack PayPal‟s ID 
easily using the Internet. Also, the management company of PayPal system seems to be a 
risk factor because it could go bankrupt with users‟ money.   Also PayPal requires Credit 
Card Number to deposit money to the PayPal account, thus it has the same problems as 
credit card payment models have. 
Net bill is designed for micro-payments, i.e., a small amount such as a fraction of a 
dollar, especially for information content delivered over the Internet.  However, Net bill 
is currently a theoretical system and hasn‟t been deployed yet [14].  
NetCheque is a distributed accounting service. Users of NetCheque have accounts on 
account servers. When a customer buys an item, they write an electronic document (a 
check) with electronic signature, and then send it to the merchant [15].  NetCheque is 
based on the Kerberos concept [24] and Electronic Check.  It is the first attempt to apply 
the Kerberos concept to a payment system, which allows the system to maintain high 
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security and reliability. However, NetCheck is not considered practical and hasn‟t been 
implemented in the industry.  
2.3 Credit (or debit) Card Payment Model 
The greatest difference between an account-based system and a credit card payment 
system is that customers do not need to make an account to use a credit card system, and 
credit card information is the only thing needed for authentication [7][8].  This model is 
most widely used in the Internet due to its simplicity and convenience for customers. 
However, due to this simple authentication scheme, it results in numerous problems such 
as credit card fraud and counterfeiting.  The purpose of our proposed system is fully 
utilizing the benefits of the credit card system, while removing this vulnerability by not 
using the credit card number directly. Therefore it is necessary to understand how credit 
card system operates currently.  
2.3.1 Card Payment Processing Network 
 
 
Figure 1  Current Payment process under Credit Card Payment Model 
 
As shown Figure 1, several elements are involved with the Card Payment Networks. 
Payment Gateway provides connectivity between Merchant (i.e. Payment site) and 
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Processor (i.e. Financial Networks). The Processor is a large data center which processes 
credit card transactions. This is how payment processing works [17]. 
1) A customer submits a card number to the merchant. 
2) Merchant sends payment information such as card number and amount of 
money to Payment Gateway. 
3) Payment Gateway passes the information from merchant to processor. 
4) Processor sends the information to customer‟s bank. 
5) Customer‟s bank sends transaction result (approved or rejected) to the 
processor. 
6) Processor passes the transaction result to the payment gateway.  
7) Payment gateway sends the transaction information to the merchant. 
8) Merchant saves transaction information for the settlement and sends 
confirmation number to the customer. 
  In step 8), the money is not transferred from the money to the merchant‟s bank at the 
moment of card processing. Instead, settlement is delivered to the merchant‟s bank for 
later processing. Settlement is a merchant‟s electronic bookkeeping for the transaction of 
the payment information. 
2.3.2 Protocols for Secure Transaction of Credit Cards 
As shown Figure 1, a credit card number should be sent over the Internet. To make it 
secure between each element, especially between the customer (i.e., the card holder) and 
the Merchant, a number of methods have been suggested. To prevent eavesdropping 
during the transmission process, the transaction information is encrypted using SSL 
(Secure Socket Layer). SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is a very popular web content 
9 
 
encryption technology, not a payment protocol, and virtually all credit card transactions 
are encrypted using SSL nowadays. SSL employs asymmetric key encryption for the 
communication between customers and merchants, and allows the user to authenticate the 
identity of the merchant using digital certificate [4].  In many cases, the credit card 
numbers are stored at merchant‟s database either on purpose or by negligence. So, there 
is a possibility that the database is cracked by hacker or used illegally by insiders on the 
merchant side.   Most of card numbers fraud comes from this.  Besides, recently SSL 
based on HTTP (-HTTPS) could be hacked by several tools such as  sslstrip which can 
trick Web Browsers into thinking they are on a secure site [18][19].  
SET (Secure Electronic Transaction) is security protocol for the card payment over 
the Internet proposed by Visa, MasterCard, and other companies. It consists of five 
protocols (cardholder registration, merchant registration, purchase request, payment 
authorization, and payment capture) [5]. Unlike SSL, SET prevents merchants from using 
customer‟s credit card number illegally because cardholder shares order information with 
merchant and shares payment information only with bank (dual signature). However, 
SET failed to be implemented in the industry due to its complexity which gave burden to 
the customers. 
The concept of one-time Credit card number (deposable number, single-use number)  
[20]  is recently used  in the market place such as American Express, Discover, MBNA, 
and Visa‟s Gift Cards [21].  One-time credit card number is only for single use. After 
using single-use number, illegal use of the card number is impossible. From this way, 
customers do not need to worry about credit card number theft. However, whenever they 
buy things, customers should have online connection with card issuer to have new card 
10 
 
number which is burden to both customers and card issuers. To solve this problem, 
Yingjiu Li proposed one-time payment scheme which generate card numbers with hash 
function [22]. However, in this scheme, we cannot use current credit card because it 
























3.1 Cryptography and Mcrypt 
Cryptography is hiding information [23].  When Alice wants to share information 
only with Bob, she encrypts the original data (plaintext) with her key and sends it 
(encrypted data – cipher text) to Bob. Bob can read the cipher text by decrypting it with 
his key. Anyone else Bob and Alice cannot share the information without specific key.  
This is how Cryptography works.  We can divide cryptography algorithm into two groups 
– symmetry key and asymmetry key. In a symmetry key system, we encrypt and decrypt 
data with same key.  AES, DES, RC4 and so forth belongs to symmetry key system. 
Unlike symmetry system in an asymmetry key (called also public-key) system, we use 
different key for encryption and decryption of data.  RSA is an example of asymmetry 
key.  
Hash function is used in the cryptography for the integrity of data. It gets block of 
data as its argument and returns a bit string called hash value or message digest. This 
value is used to check of the data modification detect by adding it to the end of the data at 
the sender‟s side and by comparing hash value from sender  and new hash value generate 
by a receiver.  SHA1 and MD5 is an example of cryptographic has function. 
There are lots of secured Cryptography algorithms, and some programming libraries 
offer these algorithms.  Mcrypt is an open source implementation of cryptography 






Kerberos is designed at MIT to protect network services provided by Project Athena. 
Currently, we use Kerberos Version 5 defined in RFC 4210. 
It is authentication protocol to prove client‟s identity attempting to log on server and 
encrypts their communications through secret-key cryptography for an unsecure network 
[25][26].  It never sends password over the network, so the password is protected against 
*eavesdropping  and 
*
replay attacks. It also solves Key Distribution problems between 
client and server with Ticket. 
 Eavesdropping attacks (Man-in-the-middle attack) - attacker makes independent 
connections with the victims and relays messages between them, making them 
believe that they are talking directly to each other. 
 Replay attack - a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or 
delayed.  
It requires additional servers -Authentication Server, and Ticket-Granting Server.  
When client is authenticated, it gets TGT (Ticket-Granting Ticket) from Authentication 
Server.  With TGT, client can get Ticket for specific server from a Ticket-Granting 
Server.  With Ticket, client can login application server.  
The advantage of Kerberos system is that a user does not need to register in each 





Figure 2 Kerberos System 
 
3.2.1 Participants of Kerberos 
 Client (user)      
 S: Application Server 
 Authentication server (AS) – check whether a user is registered in system and 
generates   Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT).  It does not care about how many 
application servers are in the system. 
 Ticket Granting Server (TGS) – verify TGT and issue Ticket.  It does not care 
how many users are registered in the system. 
 Ticket: Kerberos data structure that can be safely sent across the networks. 
When the ticket is valid, the sender of it can prove its identity.   
 Ticket has two properties like this. 
o All tickets in Kerberos are encrypted with the key of the final recipient.  
o Client has no knowledge of the tickets‟ content. 
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3.2.2 Keys in Kerberos 
 
Figure 3 Keys in Kerberos 
 
  As shown above, different keys are shared between elements. 
  Notation 
 KAB   : Secret Key between A and B 
 {Clear Text} KAB  : clear text  encrypted with key  KAB 
 KAS,TGS ,  KAS,C , KTGS,S  is pre-defined, and  KC,TGS, KC,S  is dynamically 
generated 
 NC and N‟C are a nonce generated by Client 
 Nonce: A randomly chosen value, different from previous choices, inserted in 
a    message to protect against replays. 
 Lk: ticket lifetime (valid period).          




3.2.3 Flow of Kerberos 
0) User enters ID and Password (Password is secret key between Client and AS). 
1) Client sends TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) request message to the AS.  
 
 
Figure 4-A Data Flow from Client to AS in Kerberos 
 
„From‟ and „to‟:  time interval used for Key validation. 
2) When AS receives message, AS checks if the user is in the database.  If the user 
exists, AS generates session key (KC,TGS)  and TGT , and sends them into  message  
composed with 2 parts to the client.  
 
Figure 4-B Data Flow from AS to Client in Kerberos 
 
As shown step 1, 2 Password is never sent over the network. It is used as a Key for 
encryption and decryption.  
3) Clients receive message from AS, and encrypt the second message with Password 
(KAS,C) to get a session Key(KC,TGS) and other information.   After then, client sends 
message including TGT after encrypting it with KC,TGS  to the TGS.   
16 
 
              
Figure 4-C Data Flow from Client to TGS in Kerberos 
 
 
4) TGS receives message from the client and with TGT from which it gets  KC,TGS.  
And then TGS decrypt the rest of message.  If TGS is valid, it generates Ticket and 
Client/server session key (KC,TGS ) and send them to the client.           
 
Figure 4-D Data Flow from TGS to Client in Kerberos 
 
5) After getting message from TGS, Client sends Ticket to Server to get access 
permission to server. 
 
Figure 4-E Data Flow from Client to Server in Kerberos 
 
6) Server sends Confirmation Message encrypted with Client/server session key (KC,S) 




Figure 4-F Data Flow from Server to Client in Kerberos 
 
3.3 SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and Open SSL 
  The SSL is used for secure communication over a network which works on 
Transport Layer between two applications.  It is based on public key cryptography to 
accomplish its tasks, and provides server authentication and encrypted data 
communication channel.  It uses digital certificate for certification of participants, 
especially server. SSL guarantee   higher security providing Confidentiality, Identity 
authentication, and Message integrity verification [4].  Open SSL is an open source 
















SECURE ON-LINE CREDIT CARD TRANSACTION METHOD 
As we discuss chapter 3, Kerberos system is very secure and reliable [26].  Some 
payment protocols such as NetCheque [15] are suggested based on this protocol. 
However, they are theoretical and never implemented industry domain.  Our solution is 
also based on Kerberos, but we modify the protocol to make it practical payment system. 
So our new system works under current card payment network and card holders and 




Figure 5 - A System flow of NNCC 
 
This new system looks similar to Kerberos because of its structure. You can regard 
customer as client, PAS as AS, PGS as TGS, and merchant as server in Kerberos. 
However, it has several different things. First, the operation sequence is different. Second, 
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it does not have key between merchant and customer while Kerberos has key between 
client and server. Third, it has new communication relationship between merchant and 
PGS. Fourth, it has reverse operation (refund operation).  Besides, its token contents are 




Figure 5 - B System Flow of NNCC with Actual Data 
 
As shown Figure 1, in current card payment flow, customer is connected to merchant 
and merchant is linked with Payment Gateway. In our solution illustrated by Figure 4-A 
and 4-B , PGS server (TGS server in Kerberos) which replaces Payment Gateway is 




Figure 6 Keys in NNCC 
 
Two tokens are used – Session Tokens and Payment Tokens.  
Session Token means the authorization of customer like TGT in Kerberos.   
Payment Token contains information of client and merchant, and the amount of 
money paid.  
 
Figure 7 Sequence Diagram of NNCC for Payment 
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  The rough process is like this. First of all, customer sends card information to the 
PAS server, and gets a session token. After that, Customer sends payment information 
(the amount of money and merchant name) with session token to the PGS instead of 
merchant, and gets Payment Token from PGS.  And then, customer sends Payment Token 
to the merchant.  Last, to make actual payment, merchant sends transaction number 
included in Payment Token to PGS server. Payment token is also used for merchant‟s 
settlement processing afterwards.  After PGS receives transaction number, it proceeds 
actual payment processing.      
4.1 Advantage of the System  
  The advantages of Kerberos system becomes those of this payment system. User 
does not need to send card information to the each merchant and merchant does not need 
to have user card information. This prevents merchant or its employee from stealing 
customers‟ card information because merchant cannot save card information in its 
database. Under this flow, Credit card number encrypted with user password is sent to 
PAS.  So even if card number is known to other, he or she cannot get session Token from 
Payer Authentication Server without knowing user‟s password which is pre-registered 
through the trust path. In other words, he or she cannot get payment Token. Also, mutual 
authentication is implemented among payment systems, merchant and customer because 
each participant needs to know its shared key to communicate with each other.   So, 
merchant can verify whether the customer is an actual owner or not.  This is important 
because the merchant is entirely responsible for the loss from the card number theft in 




We are also sure that the migration from current existing system to our new system is 
easy and simple. Customer only needs to download tiny software program, and merchant 
just need to send transaction number in the Payment Token from the customer, instead of 
card information and the amount   to the Payment Gateway (Payment Granting Server).  
This is important because several secure payment system has been proposed, but they are 




Detailed payment process is like this. 
1) User enters ID, card Information and Password (Password become Key between 
Client and PAS). 
2) Client sends data (ID, card Information) after encrypting them with user password. 
 
 
Figure 8-A Data Flow from Client to PAS in NNCC 
 
  „from‟ and „to‟ indicates a specified time interval. 
3) PAS process user request as like this 
a. Check whether user is registered or not.  If registered, decrypt message. 
b. Card information is registered to the database.  The information is 
automatically deleted on the time when session token is expired in client side.  
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c. Generate session token and send it to the client.  
 
 
Figure 8-B Data Flow from PAS to Client in NNCC 
 
4) Customer decides to purchase things. 
5) Merchant sends Amount and Merchant ID to Customer. 
6) Client Program sends Payment Information such as Merchant ID and amount of 
money encrypted with key and session token to PGS server. 
  
 
Figure 8-C Data Flow from Client to PGS in NNCC 
 
7) PGS work like this. 
a. Check if Session token is valid. 




c. Generate Key shared between merchant and client, and Payment Token for 
merchant. 
d. Send Key (K
C,M
) and Payment Token to the Client. 
 
 
Figure 8-D Data Flow from PGS to Client in NNCC 
 
8) Client sends Payment Token to the merchant. 
 
 
Figure 8-E Data Flow from Client to Merchant in NNCC 
 
9) Merchant extracts Transaction number from the Payment Token and sends with 
amount to PGS server.  
 
 
Figure 8-F Data Flow from Merchant to PGS in NNCC 
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10) After PGS server getting Transaction number from the merchant, actual payment 
process starts. 
a. From the Transaction number, PGS server retrieves Payment Information 
(card #, amount, merchant ID) from its database. 
b. PGS sends the Information to the Processor. 
11) Processor request services to Client‟s bank. 
12) Customer‟s Bank response to the Processor (Accept or Reject). 
13) PGS receives confirmation number from the Processor. 
14) PGS sends confirmation number to the merchant. 
 
 
Figure 8-G Data Flow from PGS to Merchant in NNCC 
 
15) The merchant sends this number to the client. 
 
 




  Stage 0, 1, 2 is the process of getting session token. If a client has a valid session 
token, it does not need to get a new session token as long as the session token is valid.  
However, it has to request payment token every payment process. 
4.2.2 Refund 
  Refund is a just reverse process of payment.  We assume client has a valid session 
token. Customer can get session token without credit card number, because refund 
process does not require card information but transaction Reference Number. 
 
 
Figure 9 Sequence Diagram of NNCC for REFUND 
 
  0) Customer claims a refund. 




Figure 10-A Data flow from Merchant to PGS in NNCC for Refund 
 
  2) After getting request, PGS sends REFUND token and data to the Merchant.  
 
 
Figure 10-B Data flow from PGS to Merchant in NNCC for Refund 
 
3) Merchant sends “REFUND TOKEN” to the Client. 
 
 
Figure 10-C Data flow from Merchant to Client in NNCC for Refund 
 




Figure 10-D Data flow from Client to PGS in NNCC for Refund 
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5)  After PGS server getting Transaction number from the client, actual REFUND 
process starts. 
a. From the Transaction number, PGS server retrieves Payment Information 
(Transaction Reference Number, amount, merchant ID, UID) from its database. 
b. PGS sends the information to the Process 
After several steps, PGS receives confirmation number from the Processor. 
6) PGS sends confirmation number to the client. 
 
 
Figure 10-E Data flow from PGS to Client in NNCC for Refund 
 
4.2.3 Installment (Periodic Payment) 
  In the current payment system, Installment   through the Credit Card Company 
requires additional Interest.  Besides, Debit card does not allow it. In our system, we can 
provide this function without Interest to customer s regardless of their card type (debit or 
credit).  The idea is simple. PGS has additional information on its database for this (refer 
to database structure 5.5.3). PGS will do most of work.  At the first payment, PGS use 
customer‟s credit card number. From second payment, PGS will use Transaction 
Reference Number of previous transaction which does not require customer‟s credit card 
number.  Actual process will be same with the general payment Process to both customer 
and merchant. Customer just needs to request TOKEN for Installment instead of general 




Figure 11-A TOKEN for Installment 
 
Figure 11-A shows Token for Installment. PGS will divide the Amount with n (the 
value of „times‟) and request payment with the quotient to the processor for n times.     
 
   
Figure 11-B TOKEN for Periodic Payment 
 
Figure 11-B shows Token for Periodic Payment. PGS will request payment with the 















The proposed protocol is implemented using C.  We use Crypt library for the 
encryption and open SSL library for data communication.  To show all the payment 
process during the payment process, we install open source shopping mall package 
written in PHP and modify it to link our payment system.  PAS and PGS module works 
under both UNIX and Windows system.  PAS and PGS could be physically separated 
depending on database type.  In this chapter, we describe how we implement our system 
in detail. 
5.1 System Organization 
 
 




The connection between customer and Merchant is based on HTTPS or HTTP.  
Merchant keeps connection to the PGS continuously for the efficiency. 
5.2 Data Transfer Modules 
  To achieve highest secure channel among the element, we implement new data 
communication module. In new module, we use two functions - Send and Recvline.  
Figure 9, shows protocol stack of this library.    
 
 
Figure 13   Data Communication Layer of NNCC 
 
5.2.1 Randomization of Cryptography Algorithm 
  Encryption method (or algorithm) is also random.  MCrypt library we are using in 
our program provides a lot of encryption algorithms.  If we use one of them continuously, 
there could be possibility of password cracking by Guessing, dictionary and brute force 
attacks. To decrease the possibility of this attack, we can choose an algorithm at random 
when each element sends data to other.   Before we send data, we put the 2bit flag (called 
num) to indicate which algorithm is used. 
5.2.2 Data Transfer with SSL 
  To maintain most secure channel among elements in the system, we can use SSL 
protocol in our communication.  It means that we encrypt data with key, the encrypted 
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data is transferred under [27] open-SSL library instead of socket library.  Figure 13 
shows the implementation of 5.2.1 and 5.2. 
5.3 Token in Real System 
  Normally, when we send well-organized data, we use structure (or class) in the 
programming.  We read and write data by structure.   However, in our system we 
represent data in other way. Each data ends with newline, and fields in each data group 
are distinguished with special character.  Before sending data, we encrypt the data, 
change the encrypted data into hexadecimal value, and we add hash value of the data to 
check data modification during the transmission. We also generate token in this way. 
5.3.1 Session Token 
Table 1 Session Token 
KC,PGS Valid Until UID 
Key between  client and PGS The time Token expires User ID 
Abcdef OCT 10 2009 13:00 Vista 
Session Token data abcdef||OCT 10 2009 13:00||Vista 
Token after encryption 8c3c6438dd4de73f9cb536252894d293318e17e57958a41ef0fff903240314c4 
 
As shown in Table 1, session token in NNCC is similar to session ticket in Kerberos 
except for that fact token in NNCC has hash value at the end of it. With hash value, we 






5.3.2 (Payment) Token 





 Valid Until Trans# UID MID AMT TIMES CYCLE 
Key Time 
stamp 














Abcdef 2 am Oct 10… 100 vista eBay $50 1 0 
Token data Abcdef||2 am||oct 10 2009 13:30||100||vista||eBay||$50||1||0 





Payment token in NNCC is totally different from ticket in the Kerberos. Payment 
token has fields related to payment while ticket has data for the access of the system. 
Also, final recipient of payment token is a merchant or customer while that of ticket in 
Kerberos is only server. Because of this, NNCC could be applied to B2B, C2C as well as 
C2B. 
5.4 Keyboard Interface 
  Attackers can steal information by installing Key logger software in a user‟s 
computer. Key logger software catches keyboard input by interrupting key board message, 
and sends it to an attacker. In our system, we do not allow keyboard input in registering 
card number from a keyboard directly and provides button interface for it instead. 
However, each button always has same value; it could be cracked by another malware. So, 




Figure 14 Number Input Interface against Key Logger 
 
5.5 Database Structure 
These are database schema we are proposing in NNCC.   
5.5.1 User Table 
Table 3 User Table 
UID NAME Password 
User login ID User Name K
PAS,C
 
Vista JUNG EUN KIM 123 
   
When PAS receives message from a client, it needs KPAS,C to decrypt the message.                         
From the user table, PAS gets KPAS,C  of the client.  (* 4.2.1 – 1) 




Figure 15 User Table in mySQL 
 
5.5.2 Card Information Table 
Table 4   Card Information Table 
UID CNUM EXP Availability 
User login ID  Card Number Card expiration date Valid Until 
Vista 1234 June 10 2009  17 sep 19:30 
Each row is automatically deleted on the specific time (the value of availability field).  
 
  When PAS decrypts card information, it inserts the information in this table and 
generates Session Token.   The value of “availability” field in a each row is the same with 
that in the session token. (i.e when the session token expires, the related row in this table 
is deleted at the same time)  (*4.2.1 – 2) 
  When PGS sends Transaction Information to the processor, it uses this table to 
retrieve card information. (*4.2.1 – 9) 
In the real system, we need to encrypt card information table.  
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Figure 16 Card Information Table in mySQL 
 
5.5.3 Transaction Table 
TABLE 5 Transaction Table  















         
Transaction type:    Normal: N Refund: R Installment: I                            
Status: Waiting (for request) :W  Processed: P  N:  newly triggered by Installment     
TxnRef : Transaction Reference Number ( returned by Processor used Refund )                                                                                                                                                     
 
  When PGS receives Token request message including amount, merchant ID from a 
client, it inserts information in this table and generates Token.     (4.2.1 – 6)                                                                  
When PGS receives Transaction number from a merchant  (4.2.1 – 8),  sends Transaction 
Information to the processor in order to make actual payment (4.2.1 – 9) after joining 
Card Information Table and Transaction Table. 
This is an example of actual data in the Transaction Table. 
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TABLE 6 Transaction Table Example 
TYPE SEQ UID MID CNUM Amount Availability TXNREF Status 
N 1 Vista eBay NULL $50.00 17-01 19:30 NULL W 
N 2 Ms eBay 4A2BC $30.00 NULL 1237367 P 
R 3 Ta Yahoo A1313 $30.00 NULL 4646788 P 
         
 
Transaction (SEQ) 1:   Payment Token is issued to the client (vista), but PGS does 
not receive transaction umber from the merchant (yahoo).  When PGS receives 
transaction number (1), it will send the processor all the information including customer‟s 
(vista) card information from the card information table    
                       Ex) – [1234567890/June 10 2011/yahoo.com/$50.00] 
Transaction 2: Payment Token was issued and PGS got transaction number from 
eBay.   
Transaction 3: Refund Token was issued to yahoo and PGS got transaction number 
from the customer. 
 
 




  In this chapter, we will show how our payment system works 
5.6.1 Session Token Generation 
 
 
Figure 18 Session Token Generation 
 
  As you see in Figure 18, we need to input card information, ID, and Key to get a 
session token.  We do not need to get the session token as long as we have valid one. 
5.6.2 Payment Token Generation 
 
 
Figure 19 Payment Token Generation 
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  We can get Payment Token if we have valid session token. To acquire payment 
token, we need to give Merchant ID and amount of money. After getting Payment Token, 
it is automatically saved in the clipboard. 
5.6.3 Payment Process 
 
 




Figure 20–B   Billing Information in the E-Commerce Site Using NNCC 
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  Figure 20-A and 20-B show a payment page of E-commerce site using NNCC. 
Instead of giving card information, we pass payment token to the page. Passing payment 























   CHAPTER 6 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
6.1 Security Analysis 
6.1.1 Attack by Hacker 
 Packet Sniffing (Password Guessing Attack)   
All the data is transferred over the SSL in our system.  SSL can be cracked with 
password guessing attack.  However, if the Key of SSL Key is 128 bits, it is almost 
impossible to crack the SSL communication.  Unfortunately, even if SSL is cracked 
within a very short time by chance, the attacker has another challenge to decrypt the 
message or token also decrypted with other algorithm.  It means that Packet sniffing is 
impossible against our system while Kerberos Ticket and message are vulnerable against 
offline password guessing attack. 
 Replay Attack 
Replay attack in Kerberos between client and server which intercepts Ticket for 
server and reuse it later seems to be impossible because of time stamp in the ticket. 
However, if two systems‟ time clocks are different, it could be possible. Besides, 
according to Kasslin and Tikkanen‟s research, Replay attack exists against SMB and 
Kerberos 5 on a Windows domain [28].   
In NNCC, even without time stamp, replay attack is impossible because Payment 
token is for the single use. Payment token has transaction number on it, so after merchant 





 Database stealing 
Merchants‟ databases do not have any card information, so an attack to such merchant 
is useless. Attacker also will target our server.  We delete card information in the 
database when user‟s session token expires.  So, attacker cannot get much card 
information from the database.  Also, each card‟s information is divided to several data 
unit; each unit is encrypted before being saved to the database.  These will make very 
difficult for attacker bring customers‟ complete card information within short time. 
6.1.2 Fraud by Customer 
A customer can cheat a merchant.  The key KPGS,M might be guessed by clients 
because the key is fixed. In this case, customer requests Payment Token with less money 
than merchant ask for, and then send it merchant after changing the amount in the token 
to the amount merchant asked.  We can solve this problem easily.  If a merchant sends 
transaction number with the amount in the token to the PGS, we can know if the payment 
Token is modified or not. 
6.1.3 Fraud by Merchant 
It is impossible in our system because merchant does have customer‟s credit card 
number and does not decide the amount of money in the payment Token. 
6.2 Communication Cost Comparison 
  In this section, we show the communication cost (size of data transferred) of our 
system compared to current SSL based payment system.  We ignore the overhead from 
the SSL and other data. We just focus on the data needed to card transaction. We assume 
that the amount of data between Payment Gateway and Merchant is at least 400 bytes as 




Table 7 Client‟s Communication Cost in NNCC 
 From Client  To the Client Total 
PAS 32 (card) + 32 (etc) 32 (Session Token) 96 bytes 
PGS 32 (Session Token) 64 (Token) 96 bytes 
Merchant  64 (Token)  8 (confirmation ) 72 bytes 
Total   264(*168 ) bytes  
*If a customer has a session, he or she does not need to connect PAS. 
Table 8 Client‟s Communication Cost in Current System 
 From Client  To the Client Total 
Merchant 32 (card information)   8(Confirmation) 40 bytes 
 
  As you shown in Table 8, client on the SSL-based system (40bytes) is more efficient 
than ours (264 bytes). However, the size of data is lower than 1k bytes. In other world, 
this difference does not make any inconvenience to customers. 
6.2.2. Merchant 
Table 9 Communication of Merchant in NNCC 
 From Merchant To the Merchant Total 
Client 8 bytes 64 bytes 72 bytes 
PGS 16 bytes 8 bytes 24 bytes 







Table 10 Merchant‟s Communication Cost in Current System 
 From Merchant To the Merchant Total 
Client 8 bytes 32 bytes 40 bytes 
Payment Gateway   400  bytes 
   440 bytes 
 
  In merchant sides, our system (96 bytes) is much more efficient than current existing 
system (440 bytes). 
6.2.3 Payment Gateway (PGS) 
Table 11 Communication Cost of PGS in NNCC 
 From PGS To PGS Total 
Client 64 bytes 32 bytes 96 bytes 
Merchant 8  bytes 16 bytes 24 bytes 
   120 bytes 
 
Table 12 Payment Gateway‟s Communication Cost in Current System 
 From P.G  To P.G Total 
Merchant   400 bytes 
 
  Even if our PGS have to process two requests for one transaction, the total amount 
of data for PGS is much less than payment gateway in the current system. 
6.3 Client (User) Input Cost Comparison 
  In this section, we will show that the number of key input in our system is less than 




Figure 21 Key Inputs under Credit Card Payment Model 
 
  As you know, we need to give card holders name, card number, expiration date, and 
3 digit security codes in the current SSL-based payment system. Sometimes merchant 
also ask 5 digit zip codes. If we assume our name consists of 10 characters, we need to 
type at least 34 characters. 
 
 
Figure 22 Key Inputs under NNCC 
 
  In our system, we only need merchant ID and Amount of money to make a payment 
in case we have valid session token. Besides, we can give payment token to the merchant 
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with just one key input because token is copied into clipboard. From this, we just need at 
most 14 characters input to make payment.   If we do not have valid session token, we 
need to type 23 characters more which make total input 37 characters.   
6.4 Processing Cost 
Server should allow concurrent users to request service for the customers‟ satisfaction.  
PAS and PGS are also designed to process multiple requests concurrently.  Each request 
will hold server resource and compete with other requests, which delays response time to 
each client (customer).  Processing time in PAS or PGS divided into three parts – 
communication time, time to perform cryptography algorithm, and the payment 
processing time.   
  In this section, we will show the average processing time of PAS and PGS for each 
request.  We execute client, PAS and PGS at the same server during the measurement 
process.  We found that when number of concurrent user increase, the processing time 
also increases. However, even if the processing time increases, it will not give customers 
inconvenience because the increased time is still less than 0.1 second. If we separate PAS, 
PGS and client, we will get better performance. 
 
 































































CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusion 
It is obvious that if we do not provide credit card numbers to the merchants during the 
electronic payment, we can tremendously decrease the number of credit card fraud. To 
acquire this goal, we implement new payment system (called NNCC) based on Kerberos 
framework which has been proven to be secure. In the proposed system, payment tokens 
are passed into the merchant instead of card information. So the merchant or a database 
hacker cannot acquire and illegally use the credit card number.  Besides, a token is 
cryptographically secure and valid only for the designated merchant, so it is robust 
against eavesdropping.  Our approach can be applied to current card payment system with 
minor modification of current payment workflow by sending token to the Payment 
Gateway instead of credit card information in the merchant side. From this, we can 
conclude that NNCC is secure and reliable credit card payment system which can be 
easily implemented in the current Electronic Payment System. 
7.2 Future Work 
We show that the proposed system works practically in the current card payment 
environment. However, to be widely used, we need to implement NNCC in the 
distributed environment in order to process millions of transactions in a second and to 
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